LEE vs. JONES.

novel idea that equity, which is admitted to moderate the law, is
to supersede it altogether. It is not necessary to notice the remaining assignments of error in detail; it is sufficient to say, that
in none of them do we discover any error.
The judgment is affirmed.
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Court of Exchequer Ohamber.
LEE AND OTHERS VS. J0NES.
P., who sold goods on commission for the plaintiffs, being in arrear in his
payments to the extent of 13001., was required by the plaintiffs to give them, in
addition to an existing guarantee of 3001. from his mother, further security. P.
then procured the defendant and others t'o give a guarantee for three years for
the sums set opposite their respective names, in all 3001. The agreement recited
that P. had for some time past been a salesman for the plaintiffs, he, the said P.,
giving bills to them for all such coals as were delivered to his order, the bills
being floating bills, to be settled for and paid up monthly; there was no recital
of P. being then indebted to the plaintiffs, and the present guarantee was
expressed to be in addition and supplemental to the former guarantee. To an
action against the defendant for his proportion, the defendant pleaded fraudulent
conbealment of material facts:-Held (affirming the decision of the Court of
Common Pleas),
Per CROMPTOx, BLACEBURN, and SHEE, JJ., and CHANNELL, B.-That the suppression by the plaintiffs of P.'s indebtedness to them at the time of the agreement entered into, was evidence of fraud to jo to a jury.
Per POLLOCK, C. B., and BRAMWELL, B.-That there was no evidence of fraud
whatever.

This was an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common
Pleas, discharging a rule to set aside a verdict found for the defendant, and instead thereof to enter a verdict for the plaintiffs.
The declaration stated, that by a certain agreement, after
reciting that James Packer had for some time then past been a
salesman of coals, upon commission, for the plaintiffs, he, the
said James Packer, giving bills of exchange to the plaintiffs for
all such coals as might be delivered to his order, such bills being
floating bills, to be settled for and paid up at the expiration of
the current months during which such bills were respectively
running; and after reciting that the plaintiffs requiring security
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from the said James Packer, they stipulated among other things,
that N. C. Sendall, G. Theobald, J. G. Antrobus, the defendant,
and H. W. Ruel, should give them, the plaintiffs, a floating and
continuing guarantee, for the term of three years from the date
of the said agreement, on behalf of the said James Packer, to
secure them, the said plaintiffs, the amount of any balance which
might at any time or times be due to them, the plaintiffs, from
the said James Packer, upon any such coal account or bills to the
amount of 3001., in the appropriations following :-The defendant
in the sum of 1001., and each of the other sureties in the sum of
50.-making together the said sum of 300l. And in order to
induce the plaintiffs to continue the said arrangements with the
said James Packer, the said N. C. S., G. T., J. G. A., the defendant, and H. W. R., agreed to enter into the said agreement
for guarantee, in manner thereinafter appearing, they, the said
N. C. S., G. T., J. G. A., the defendant, and H. W. R., in consideration that the plaintiffs would continue for more than one
month then next, to allow the said James Packer a certain com.
mission upon the sale of coals referred to in an agreement between
the said James Packer and the plaintifs, bearing date the lta
November 1856, and would not for the said month terminate and
put an end to the agreement, severally and respectively guarantied,
promised, and agreed to and with the plaintiffs, that they, the
said N. C. S., G. T., J. G. A., the defendant, and H. W. R.,
should and would severally pay and make good,, in the respective
portions hereinbefore mentioned, to the plaintiffs or their executors, &c., all such sum and sums of money as might be duo ad
owing to them, the plaintiffs, at any time or times duriag tih sadterm of three years, from the said James Packer in relaton to. "
the said agreement or bills of exchange, not exceeding in the ;.
whole the said sum of 3001. ; such guarantee to be a continuing
guarantee, and to be made good at any time by the said N. C. S.,
G. T., J. G. A., the defendant, and H. W. R., for any balance
or amount due to the plaintiffs in respect of the said agreement
between the said J. Packer and the plaintiffs during the said
term of three years. And by the said agreement it was declared
by the said N. C. S., G. T., J. G. A., the defendant, and H. W.
R., that giving time to the said James Packer by the plaintiff for
the payment of any account or balance at any time should not
invalidate the said guarantee, but that they should at all times
have it in their full power and discretion so to do, or to make
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any compromise or arrangement that they might deem beneficial
with the said James Packer; and that they, the said N. C. S.,
G. T., J. G. A., the defendant, and H. W. R., their executors,
&c., should remain liable to make good any balance or sum remaining due from the said James Packer to the said plaintiffs,
notwithstanding such time so given, or such compromise or
arrangement as aforesaid; and further, that as between them,
the said N. C. S., G. T., J. G. A.,-the defendant, and H. W. R.,
and the plaintiffs, any account stated between them and the said
James Packer, or the account books of the latter used by them
in their regular course of business, should be taken as conclusive.
evidence against the said N. C. S., G. T., J. G. A., the defendant, and H. W. R., their executors, &c., either at law or in equity,
of the amount of balance or balances due to them on the said
agreement by the said James Packer. And it was by-the said
agreement further agreed and declared, by and between the said
parties thereto, that the said agreement was to be taken and considered as supplemental, and in addition to an agreement bearing
date the 1st November 1856, made between Sarah Tinson of the
one part, and the plaintiffs and their late partner of the other
part. Averment, that the plaintiffs, confiding in the said promise
and agreement of the defendant, for more than one calendar
month after the making of the said agreement, did continue and
agree to allow to the said James Packer the said commission upon
the sale of the said coals referred to in the said agreement
between the said James Packer and the plaintiffs, and did not
during or in the said month terminate or put an end to the lastmentioned agreement as they might have done; and that afterwards, and'within the said term of three years, there became due,
and payable, and owing, in relation to and in respect of the said
agreement, from the said James Packer to the plaintiffs, a large
sum of money, such sum being due and payable as aforesaid by
the said James Packer in respect of the said coal account; that
the defendant's said proportion of the said sum of money
amounted to a large sum of money; that before and at the time
of the making of the said promise by the defendant, and from
thence and during all the time aforesaid, the plaintiffs had the
power to terminate and put an end to the said agreement between
them, the plaintiffs, and the said James Packer by the said plaintiffs giving one month's notice to the said James Packer of their,
the plaintiffs', desire to terminate and put an end to the same;
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that before the commencement of this suit all things had happened
and occurred, and all times had elapsed which it was necessary
should occur, happen, and elapse, to entitle the plaintiff to sue in
this action for the defendant's breach hereinafter mentioned of
the said promise; and that the plaintiffs had always been ready
and willing to do all things which it was necessary they should
be ready and willing to do to entitle them to sue the defendant
in this action for the said breach of promise ; and nothing had
happened or occurred to prevent the plaintiffs suing in this action
for the said breach of promise ; yet that the defendant broke his
said promise, and had not paid or made good to the plaintiffs the
said proportion of the said sum of money so due and owing as
aforesaid from the said James Packer to the plaintiffs, which he,
the defendant, agreed to pay and make good by his said promise
or any part thereof; whereby the said sum, and every part
thereof, became wholly lost to the plaintiffs.
The defendant pleaded-first, that he did not agree as alleged;
secondly, that the supposed agreement and promise was obtained
from him by the plaintiffs by the fraud of the plaintiffs, and by
the fraudulent concealment of material facts within their knowledge, respecting the said James Packer-material to be made
known by them to the defendant before he entered into the said
agreement. Issue thereon.
The action was tried before ERLE, C. J., in 1862, and was
brought to recover the sum of 1001., the amount for which the
defendant had become surety to the plaintiffs for one James
Packer, a person who had been employed by them to sell coals
on commission. It appeared that James Packer had been originally employed to sell coals for the plaintiffs under an agreement bearing date November 1856, under which he was to give
his acceptances for the amount of all coals sold by him each
month, and to account for, and pay over to the plaintiffs or their
agent, all the moneys received by him within six days of the
receipt of the same. For the due performance of this agreement
one Sarah Tinson entered into a guarantee to the extent of 3001.,
terminable on one month's notice. In September 1861, Packer
was in arrear with his payments to the extent of 12721.; and the
plaintiffs then required that he should give further security.
Packer thereupon procured the persons named in the agreement
set out in the declaration, to give their guarantee, each for the
amount set opposite to his name. In July 1862, Packer was
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dismissed, and the sureties were called upon to pay; the fact of
Packer being so largely indebted to the plaintiffs at the time of
the giving of the guarantee having then for the first time come
to their knowledge.
The learned judge left it to the jury to say whether there was
fraud on the plaintiffs' part in keeping from the defendant the
knowledge of Packer's liabilities to the plaintiffs at the time the
guarantee was given.
The verdict was found for the defendant.
A rule was then obtained, calling upon the defendant to show
cause why the verdict should not be entered for the plaintiffs, on
the ground that there was no evidence of fraud to go to the jury.
The rule was subsequently discharged.
The Solicitor- eneral, for the appellants.-In The NYorth
.British Insurance Co. vs. Lloyd, 10 Exch. 523, it was held that
the rule which prevails in insurances upon ships and lives, that
all material circumstances known to the insured must be disclosed,
though there be no fraud in the concealment, did not extend to
the case of guarantees, and that in the latter case the concealment to vitiate the guarantee must be fraudulent. POLLOCK, 0.
B., in commenting on _Railton vs. Matthe'ws, 10 01. & Fin. 934,
observes that " the point thus decided was in effect, that it was
not necessary in order to render a concealment by a person
fraudulent, that it should be made with a view to the advantage
that the mere
that person was thereby to receive..... .But
,relationship of creditor and surety requires in all cases a full disclosure of all material- circumstances, was distinctly denied by the
Lords in the case of Ramilton vs. Wratson, 12 01. & Fin. 109,
relative to an advance by bankers; and particularly by Lord
CAMP]BELL, who declares that . . . . if such was the rule it
would be indispensably necessary for the bankers, to whom the
security is to be given, to state how the account has been kept;
whether the debtor was in the habit of overdrawing ; whether he
was punctual in his dealings ; whether he performed his promises
in an honorable manner; fot all these things are extremely
material for the surety to know. But unless questions be particularly put by the surety to gain this information, I hold that it is
quite unnecessary for the creditor to whom the suretyship is to be
given, to make any such disclosure." That is the contention in
the present case; the surety was bound to ask for the information
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which he might think necessary, and there was no duty bast upon
the plaintiffs to disclose the particular fact in question.
Sir G. .Honyman (O'Malley with him), for the respondent.There was evidence to go to the jury of the fraudulent concealment of a fact material for the plaintiffs to know. In Railton
vs. Matthews, 10 01. & Fin. 934, it was held that mere non-communication of circumstances affecting the situation of the parties
material for the parties to be acquainted with, and within the
knowledge of the persons obtaining a surety bond, was undue concealment, though not wilful or intentional or with a view to any
advantage of himself. In the same case Lord CAMPBELL observes,
"cThe liability of a surety must depend upon the situation in
which he is placed, upon the knowledge which is communicated
to him of the facts of the case, and not upon what was passing
in the mind of the other party or the motive of the other party."
Lord ELDON, in the case of Smith vs. The Bank of Scotland, 1
Dow. 292, remarks that -If a man found that his agent had
betrayed his trust, that he owed him a sum of money, and that it
was likely that he was in his debt, if, under such circumstances,
he required sureties for his fidelity, holding him out as a trustworthy person, knowing or having ground to believe that he was
not so, then it was agreeable to the doctrine of equity, at least in
England, that no one should be permitted to take advantage of
such conduct, even with*a view to security against future transactions of the agent."
Cur. adv. vult.
Nov. 30.-The court being divided in opinion, their Lordships
delivered judgment seriatim.
BLACKBURN, J.-I
am of opinion that in this case the decisioa
of the court below should be affirmed.
The question is, whether, under the circumstances stated in the
case, there was evidence to go to the jury in support of the averment of fraud; for I think that the averments of undue conceal,ment carry the case no further, and that unless actual fraud was
proved, that the substance of the issue was not proved. It was
decided in The North British Insurance Co. vs. Lloyd, that the
rule that all material circumstances known to the insured must be
disclosed, is peculiar to contracts of insurance, and that it does
not extend to contracts of guarantee. I concur in this, which I
think founded on principle as well as authority. It was pointed
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out by the Chief Baron in the argument of the present case, that
a surety is in general a friend of the principal debtor, acting at
his request and not at that of the creditor; and in ordinary cases
it may be assumed that the surety obtains from the principal all
the information he requires; and I think that great practical
mischief would ensue if the creditor were by law required to
disclose everything material known to him, as in a case of insurance. If it were so, no creditor could rely upon a contract of
guarantee, unless he communicated to the proposed sureties
everything relating to his dealings with the principal to an extent
which would, in the ordinary course of things, be so vexatious
and annoyiug to the principal and his friends, the intended
sureties, that such a rule would practically prohibit the obtaining
of contracts of suretyship in matters of business. This is well
pointed out by Lord CAMPBELL in his judgment in Ramilton vs.
Watson.
But I think, on authority and on principle, that where the
creditor describes to the proposed sureties the transaction proposed to be guarantied (as in general a creditor does), that
description amounts to a representation, or at least is evidence of
a representation, that there is nothing in the transaction that
might not naturally be expected to take place between the
parties to a transaction such as that described; and if a representation to this effect is made to the intended surety by one who
knows that there is something not naturally to be expected to
take place between the parties to the transaction, and that this is
unknown to the person to whom he makes the representation,
and that if it were known to him he would not enter into the
contract of suretyship, I think it is evidence of a fraudulent
representation on his part.
I think that it appears in Hamilton vs. Watson, that such was
the opinion- of Lord CAMPBELL, and I think that on this principle
are founded the judgments of Lord ELDON in Smith vs. The
Bank of Scotland, and -of the Court of King's Bench in Pideock
vs. Bishop, 3 B. & Cr. 605.
In the present case the plaintiffs had no personal communication
with the defendant, the surety, and when they sent the agreement to him for execution, they sent it by an agent who had no
authority from the plaintiffs to make any statement whatever, or
to do any more than - obtain the defendant's signature to the
agreement thus sent.
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The argument for the plaintiffs before us was, in substance,
that under such circumstances, though there might be a concealment or non-disclosure of material facts, there was not, and could
not be, any misrepresentation on the plaintiffs' part, and that
without it there could be no fraud ; and during the argument I
was inclined to be of that opinion, but on consideration have
come to the conclusion that in this case there was evidence of
intentional deceit by a false representation of the kind I have
above referred to, amounting to actual fraud.
The written agreement, which before it was executed the plain.
tiffs sent to the defendant, recites that Packer the principal had
been for some time salesman to the plaintiffs on terms, by which
he was, in substance, to be a del credere agent, selling and paying
for what he had sold monthly; and that they had required from
him security to induce them to continue him in the employment,
and stipulated that the defendant and others should give them
a floating and continuing guarantee for the term of three years
from the date thereof, to secure the amount of any balance which
might at any time be due on the coal account. I think this was
evidence of, or rather, if not qualified by other matters, amounted
to a representation, that there was nothing in the transaction
between the plaintiffs and Packer which might not, in the ordinary course of affairs, be expected to have taken place between
them, as parties to such a transaction. It is stated in the case,
' that at the time when this agreement was sent to the defendant,
a balance of 13321. was actually then due from Packer, he not
having for a very considerable time settled for, and paid up, at
the expiration of the current months, as stipulated by the agreement ; it is, however (in favor of the plaintiffs), further stated,
that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs were aware that
Packer had actually received the money from the customers.
Now, whether the handing the agreement by the plaintiffs to
the defendant amounted to an inaccurate representation or not,
depends, as I think, on the question whether, insuch a transac.
tion as that described in the agreement, it might, or might not,
naturally be expected that the masters might have allowed a balance of this extent to accumulate, and might have allowed the
accounts to stand over unsettled for so long a time.
In Hamilton vs. Watson, the transaction was a security for a
banker's cash account, and the decision of the House of Lords
was, that in such a case it might be so naturally expected that
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the proposed principal had already overdrawn his account, that
there was no evidence of a representation that he had not.
In Smith vs. The Bank of Scotland, where the security was
given for the good behavior of a bank agent, it was held, that an
allegation that the bank knew that the principal had misconducted himself in his office, and that the fact was concealed from
the sureties, ought to have been admitted as proof in the court
below.
I think the effect of Lord. ELDON'S judgment in that case is,
that it was so little to be expected that a bank would continue in
their service an agent who had already, by breach of trust, run
into their debt, that the application for security amounted, as he
says, to " holding him forth to the sureties as a trustworthy person :" 1 Dow 292.
I think it must in every case depend upon the nature of the
transaction, whether the fact not disclosed is such, that it is impliedly represented not to exist, and that must generally be a
question of fact, proper for a jury. If in this case the amount
of the balance already due had been small, or the period during
which the accounts were left unsettled short, there would, in my
opinion, have been such a mere scintilla of evidence as would not
have warranted the jury in finding the verdict of fraud, and the
judge would have been justified in withdrawing the question from
their consideration. But as it is, the amount of the balance
already due being, relatively to the amount of the surety, so
large, and the period during which no settlement had taken place
being so considerable, I think the judge could not have withdrawn
the case from the consideration of the jury, who might well come
to the conclusion, that the sending of the agreement in these
terms amounted to an inaccurate representation. This would not
be enough to support the verdict on the plea of fraud, unless it
was further established that the plaintiff made the inaccurate
representation, intending to deceive the defendant, and induce
him to enter into the contract in the belief, that what was represented did exist, whilst the plaintiff knew it did not exist. But
of that also I think there was sufficient.evidence.
The improbability, that any one could suppose that sureties
would have entered into such an agreement if they had known the
truth, is so great, that the jury might well think that the plain-.
tiffs knew that the defendant was in ignorance of it; and if the
jury so thought, they might from that alone draw the inference

LEE vs. JONES.

that the representation was fraudulently intended to deceive.
This is strengthened by the facts that the plaintiffs apparently
avoided having any personal communication with the proposed
sureties, and sent the agreement for execution by an agent who
had no authority from them to make any statements, from which
the jury might, perhaps, draw the further inference that the
plaintiffs took pains to avoid the risk of the sureties asking questions, and being undeceived.
It is not essential to constitute fraud that there should be any
misleading by express words; it is sufficient if it appears that the
plaintiffs knowingly assisted in inducing the defendant to enter
into the contract, by leading him to believe that which the plaintiffs knew to be false, the plaintiffs knowipg that if he had not
been thus misled, he would not have entered into the contract.
For the reasons above given, I think there was in this case
evidence to support the verdict, and consequently the judgment,
in my opinion, should be affirmed.
BRAMWELL, B.-I think this judgment should be reversed. It
is clear that nothing turns on the defendant being a surety. The
question raised, and properly raised, by the pleadings is, -was the
defendant's engagement, obtained by the plaintiff's fraud, actual,
moral fraud? The question argued before us was, was there evidence of such fraud? The court below says there was, but
unfortunately does not point out in what it consisted. With very
great respect I see none, and I think it can be shown there is
none. To constitute fraud there must be-first, the assertion of
something false, which is not the case here ; or secondly, the suppression of something true where there is a duty or profession of
stating everything material; and here there is no such duty; or
thirdly, what, perhaps, is included in one of the foregoing--a
suggestion of falsity, by statement of some facts and suppression
of others, which would qualify, as if one should say, A. was seised
and died, B. was eldest son, entered and enjoyed, and suppress
that A. made a will, and gave B. a life estate. To my mind there
is nothing of that here. Perhaps, but most improbably, the
defendant inferred or guessed that no arrears were due to the
plaintiffs. I should not ha-ve so concluded; on the contrary, I
should have concluded that there was some change in the circumstances of the parties which induced the plaintiffs to require further security. But supposing the defendant's was a right con-
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elusion, and supposing that if he could not inform himself further,
he was justified in acting on it, I say that here he was not so justified, because he might, if he cared to know them, have informed
himself of the actual facts from the plaintiffs, or if they refused
to tell him, he might have refused to be surety. I think a man
has a great right to complain of another, who charges him with
fraud, because he, the accuser, has not taken the trouble to make
a few inquiries. I really can see no evidence of any fraud, of
anything dishonest in this case. There is nothing inconsistent
with the .plaintiffs' honesty. But when the facts are equally consistent with a conclusion one way or the other, they are no evidence either way. I think the opinion there was evidence of
fraud is founded on a misapprehension. Packer is not a dishonest
defaulter to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. He was liable to
them to a large amount, .every shilling of which might have been
due from solvent debtors. The plaintiffs continued him a long
time after in their service. They sent the engagement bf suretyship to the defendant, and left it with him several days for him
to make such inquiries as he thought fit. He makes none. Suppose he had-been asked, and been told the truth, could anybody
say there had been any fraud, or attempt to fraud ? Suppose he
had employed an attorney, would any one say there was an
attempt to deceive the attorney? The notion of fraud arises
from the defendant being likely to behave foolishly, to make no
inquiry, making none, and being surety. I think this very mischievous, that a man should have his carelessness rewarded by
liberty to call out fraud. Very mischievous that people should
be charged with fraud by careless persons, simply on account of
their carelessness. No one is safe if this is allowed. No one can
ever know that he has sufficiently guarded against the rash conclusions and folly of those he deals with, and save himself from
the uncharitable and foolish conclusions a jury may be disposed
to come to in favor of a surety.
Judgment affirmed.
POLLOCK, C. B., delivered an opinion in favor of reversing the
judgment, and SHEE, J., and CROMPToN, J. (with whom CHANNELL, B., agreed), also delivered opinions for affirmance.
Vor. XIII.-32

EICOLTZ vs. BANNISTER.

Court of Common Pleas.
EICOLTZ V8. BANNISTER.
Where A. in his shop sold goods to B., which afterwards were claimed by a
third party as being his property, it was held that there was an implied warranty by A. that he had a good title to the articles sold, and therefore that B.
could recover the money which he had paid for them.

This was an action brought by a commission agent against the
defendant, a job warehouseman living at Manchester, for money
had and received. The case was tried in June last in the Man.
chester City Court of Record, before the judge and a jury, when
a verdict was found for the plaintiff for the amount claimed, leave
being reserved to the defendant to move to set this verdict aside,
and instead thereof enter it for him, or a nonsuit, on the ground
that there was no warranty of the defendant's title upon the sale
by him to the plaintiff.
It appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff, on the 18th
April, 1864, went to the defendant's warehouse and bought from
the defendant seventeen pieces of prints, of which the defendant
gave him an invoice, and in which it was stated that the prints
were bought of the defendant, job warehouseman and dealer in
prints and gray fustians, &c., of 20, Chollton street, Portland
street, Manchester, at the price of 51d. per yard, 11 per cent.
discount for cash. The price of the prints was 191., which was
paid at once, and the goods were sent to the plaintiff's warehouse.
On the following day the plaintiff sold the prints to Messrs. Brice,
Smith & Co., but they were taken from them a few days afterwards by a policeman, as having been stolen by a person who
was subsequently convicted of the theft. Brice & Co. called on
the plaintiff to refund the purchase-money, which he did, and
brought the present action to recover the price which he had paid
to the defendant.
A rule having been obtained pursuant to the leave reserved,
C. Pollocl now showed cause.-The goods in this case were
C
sold by the defendant as owner, and, according to the law of the
land, there is an implied warranty of title annexed to such sale.
It is not necessary, in order to sustain this action, that there
should be an express warranty. In 2 B1. Com. 450, it is stated
that "ca purchaser of goods and chattels may have a satisfaction
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from the seller, if he sells them as his own, and the title proves
deficient, without any express warranty for that purpose." He
cited Armstrong vs. Percy, 5 Wend. 535; 2 Kent's Com. 478 ;
Medina vs. Stoughton, 1 Ld. Raym. 593; Crose vs. Gardner,
Carth. 90; 31orley vs. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500; Simms vs.
Marryatt, 17 Q. B. 281; Chapman vs. Speller, 14 Id. 621.
.Holker, in support of the rule.-The defendant is not liable, as
the general rule is that there is no implied warranty of title in
respect of chattels. In Ormrod vs. .Huth, 14 Al. & W. 664,
TINDAL, C. J., says:
If, indeed, the representation was false to.
the knowledge of the party making it, this would in general be
conclusive evidence of fraud; but if the representation was honestly made, and believed at the time to be true by the party
making it, though not true in point of fact, we think this does
not amount to fraud in law, but that the rule of caveat emptor
applies, and the representation itself does not furnish -a ground
of action. And although the cases may, in appearance, raise
some difference as to the effect of a false assertion or representation of title in the seller, it will be found on examination that in
each of those cases there was either an assertion of title embodied
in the contract, or a representation of title which was false to the
knowledge of the seller." And in ifall vs. Conder, 2 C. B. N.
S. 22, WILLIAMS, J., says that, cWith regard to ascertained
chattels, there is not any implied warranty of either title or
quality, unless there are some circumstances beyond the mere
fact of a sale from which it may be implied."
ERLE, C. .- I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. The plaintiff has brought an action for money paid to
the defendant for drapery goods which he'bought in the shop of
the defendant, the goods having been claimed after the purchase:
by the true owner, from whom they had been stolen, and this
action is brought for money had and received, on the ground'
that the consideration for the payment of the price bad failed.
The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, a rule was'
obtained to set that verdict aside and enter it for the defendant,
or a nonsuit, on the ground that, by the common law of England,
there was no warranty of title on the sale of chattels, and that
the principle of caveat emptor applied. After listening carefully'
to the arguments, I decide, in accordance with the, current of
authorities, that where a vendor by word or conduct gives a pur-1
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chaser to understand, at the time of the sale, that he is the owner
of the goods he is selling, this is part of the contract ; and if it
should afterwards turn out that he is not the owner, an action lies
to recover the money which he has paid. In Morley vs. Atten.
borough, PARKE, B., says: " We do not suppose that there would
be any doubt if the articles were bought in a shop professedly
carried on for the sale of goods, that the shopkeeper must be considered as warranting that those who purchase will have a good
title to keep the goods purchased ;" and these remarks of the
learned judge I rely on. In this case the party buys certain
articles in a shop kept by the defendant and according to the
law as above stated, the seller represents himself to be the owner
of the goods which he has sold. In Noy's Maxims (p. 209), it is
said, that " if I take a horse of another man, and sell it, and the
owner take him again, I may have an action of debt for the
money, for the bargain was perfect by the delivery of the horse ;
and caveat emptor.' This proposition would rather shock the
understanding of ordinary men; but I take the meaning of this
to be that, where a person sells a hoise in his possession without
either affirming or denying that he has a title to it, and the purchaser accepts it on those terms and pays for the -horse, he cannot call upon the vendor to restore the price in the event of the
horse being claimed by a third person. The case of Morley vs.
Atenborough was decided on this principle; and in Chapman vs.
Speller, which was a case where a person bought the goods of an
execution-debtor from another person who had bought them at a
sheriff's sale, both parties having been present at that sale, and
the goods were taken from the last purchaser, it was held that
there was no warranty of title, and that the purchaser took. them
at his peril. Then in the case of Hall vs. Conder, which was an
assignment of a patent right, there was ne implied warranty that
the patent was useful or new, the contract between the parties
being for the sale of the patent, such as it was. I cannot help
remarking that Noy's maxim as to the purchase of a horse is a
mere dictum, and the same may be said of the remark made by
my brother WILLIAMS in Ball vs. Conder; it is nothing more
than a dictum, and has never produced the fruit of a judgment,
and this shows the wisdom of the remark of Lord CAMPBELL in
irmms vs. Marryatt, where, in commenting upon the decision in
Morley vs. Attenborough, he says, " It may be that the learned
baron is correct in saying, that on a sale of personal property,

